Now, in part these problems are predictable-- the markets haven't done so hot this year, which is when investment funds tend to struggle most: they thrive on at least somewhat efficient markets, and they do well when they can bet on past patterns repeating themselves. Any time there's a slump, a high-profile few win big (in this past slump, it was Paulson, Soros and Einhorn; in 1987's stock crash, it was Julian Robertson's Tiger and Tudor, and when the British left the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, Soros made a killing). I think the problems of a lot of these high-profile funds reflect different factors in each case: PIMCO used to be really good on macro... but in retrospect a lot of that seems to be on the shoulders of Paul McCulley, a managing director there who really understood the bond market in a way that I think even Bill Gross probably doesn't. Paulson was really a schlub who won big on a single bet; it was a huge bet, but he's shown nothing to prove that he can consistently make money, or even outperform the market, in a variety of economic environments.
For me, what these problems show is that finding a really good money manager is incredibly hard. Sure, in a given year, Greenlight might do great, or Paulson might do great, or SAC or D.E. Shaw might have a huge year. But the real test of a great manager is one who can outperform the market year over year. And, in all honesty, I don't think that more than a handful of the tens of thousands of funds can actually do that. Sure, Warren Buffett will still give you great returns if you can get money into Berkshire Hathaway... but I think about 95% of that is that Buffett's success feeds on itself at this point-- he gets terms better than anyone else because getting an investment from him inspires confidence by itself; put me in charge of Berkshire, and the terms on these investments instantly get worse, and money-making opportunities disappear (there isn't a single money manager in the world who was going to get the terms Buffett got when he put $5 billion into Goldman in 2008; it was essentially free money for him). But otherwise, I think the super-charged hedge funds of the last few decades are a relic. For instance, through the 1970s (when the economy was unusually volatile), Soros returned over 30% in his WORST year. He lost some money in '81, and in the slump of '87, and some more in the tech bust and in his Russia investments (which I think reflected his desire to be viewed as a "messiah" more than any real faith in Russia's markets in the late '90s. But it's almost impossible to imagine a manager returning over 30% year over year for a decade straight, even in boom times, let alone volatile ones.
So I think the lesson to take is to be wary-- rich people chasing hedge funds who made big returns in the past is a pretty certain recipe for future disappointment.
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